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Abstract
We consider 1927 borrowers from 54 countries who had a credit
rating by both Moody’s and S&P as of the end of 1998, and
their subsequent default history up to the end of 2002. Viewing
bond ratings as predicted probabilities of default, we show that
it is unlikely that both agencies are well calibrated, and that the
ranking of the agencies depends crucially on the way in which
probability predictions are compared.
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1 Introduction
The evaluation of the quality, in whichever way deﬁned, of default predictions
in the credit industry has received considerable attention recently (Carey 2002,
Tabakis and Vinci 2002, Engelmann et al. 2003 and many others). In particular,
there is a growing interest in comparing the accuracy of competing rating
agencies, or to rate the raters, so to speak. Also, in the wake of Basel II, there
will be a rapidly increasing number of rating producers, in addition to the
established rating agencies, and an increasing number of borrowers who are
rated by at least two of them, so it is natural to ask: which rater rates best?
This question can be answered in a variety of ways. The most popular method
is based on the accuracy ratio, i.e. on how successful a rating system is in
concentrating the defaults in the ”bad” grades, or its equivalent, the area under
the ROC-curve (see section 4 or Sobehard and Keenan 2001 for a convenient
introduction). Below, we also follow a diﬀerent approach by viewing borrower
ratings as predicted probabilities of default, and by comparing the accuracy of
these predictions across rating agencies. In doing so, we borrow heavily from
mathematical statistics, where the evaluation of probability forecasts has a
long and distinguished history (see e.g. Dawid 1982, DeGroot and Fienberg
1983, Vardeman and Meeden 1983, DeGroot and Eriksson 1985). So far, this
methodology has mostly been applied to weather forecasts (i.e. forecasts of the
probability of rain) but it can easily be extended to default predictions in the
rating industry.
Our analysis is based on 1927 borrowers, mostly industrial ﬁrms and ﬁnancial
institution from the US (68 % of all borrowers), who had a credit rating by
both Moody’s and S&P as of Dec. 31, 1998. We followed these ﬁrms up to the
end of 2002 and recorded all defaults. The data were obtained from Bloomberg
and are available from the authors on request.
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Below we apply various orderings of probability forecasts to this data set. As
these orderings are scattered in the statistics literature, we start by collecting
and brieﬂy reviewing them in section 2. Section 3 is concerned with mapping
rating grades to probabilities of default, and section 4 compares the accuracy
of the ratings, both in terms of partial orderings and in terms of various scalar
measures of performance which have been suggested in the literature. Section
5 checks for statistical signiﬁcance of the observed diﬀerences in performance,
and a brief discussion of the shortcomings of our analysis in section 6 concludes.
2 Partial orderings of probability forecasts
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < . . . < ak = 1 be k predicted probabilities of default. In
practice, k varies from 6 to about 20. The US-based Loan Pricing Corporation
has k = 10. The rating agencies which concern us in the present paper, Moody’s
and S&P , both have scales with k = 21. For ease of comparability with these
established agencies, most commercial banks also employ scales with k = 20
in their post Basel II internal rating systems.
Below we take the mechanism employed for the predictions as given. Produc-
ing the predictions is a separate problem which has engendered an enormous
literature, but will not concern us here. Modern methods, as surveyed in e.g.
Crouhy et al. (2001) or Arminger et al. (1997), include logit and probit anal-
ysis, neural networks, or classiﬁcation trees. Rather, our point of departure is
the discrete bivariate probability function r(θ, aj); θ = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., k, re-
sulting from some such method, whichever it may be, with θ = 1 indicating
default and θ = 0 indicating non-default.
The following additional notation will be used:
p(1) :=
∑
j r(1, aj) = overall relative frequency of default.
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p(0) :=
∑
j r(0, aj) = overall relative frequency of no default.
q(aj) := relative frequency with which default probability forecast
aj is made.
p(1|aj) := r(1,aj)q(aj) = conditional relative frequency of default given
probability forecast aj.
p(0|aj) := r(0,aj)q(aj) = conditional relative frequency of no default
given probability forecast aj.
q(aj|1) := r(1,aj)p(1) = conditional relative frequency of predicted de-
fault probability aj given default.
q(aj|0) := r(0,aj)p(0) = conditional relative frequency of predicted de-
fault probability aj given no default.
The problem is: given two forecasters A and B, characterized by their re-
spective bivariate probability functions rA(θ, aj) and r
B(θ, aj), which one is
”better”?
One sensible requirement is that among borrowers with predicted default prob-
ability aj, the relative percentage of defaults will be roughly equal to aj. For-
mally:
aj
!
= p(1|aj) = r(1, aj)
q(aj)
whenever q(aj) > 0. Such forecasters are called ”well calibrated” (Dawid 1982).
However, calibration, though desirable, is not suﬃcient for a useful forecast.
For instance, a probability forecaster attaching default probability p(1) to all
borrowers is well calibrated but otherwise quite useless.
Let rA(θ, aj) and r
B(θ, aj) be the joint probability functions of forecasters
A and B, respectively, with a nondegenerate marginal distribution p(θ). We
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assume that this marginal distribution is the same for both forecasters, i.e.
that both agencies rate the same set of borrowers. First, we conﬁne ourselves
to forecasters which are both well calibrated. Following DeGroot and Fienberg
(1983), we say that A is more reﬁned than B, in symbols: A ≥R B, if there
exists a k× k Markov matrix M (i.e. a matrix with nonnegative entries whose
columns sum to unity) such that
qB(ai) =
k∑
j=1
Mijq
A(aj), and (1)
aiq
B(ai) =
k∑
j=1
Mijajq
A(aj), i = 1, . . . , k. (2)
Equation (1) means that, given A’s forecast aj, an additional independent
randomisation is applied according to the conditional distribution Mij (j =
1, ..., k) which produces forecasts with the same probability function as that of
B. Condition (2) ensures that the resulting forecast is again well calibrated.
Table 1, from Kra¨mer (2003a), provides an example. Forecaster A attaches a
default probability of 2 % to all borrowers. If the overall default probability
is indeed 2 %, he is obviously well calibrated. Forecaster B is more reﬁned; he
attaches default probabilities 1 % and 3 %, respectively, to 50 % of all bor-
rowers. We assume that he, too, is well calibrated. Likewise forecasters C and
D with distributions across predicted default probabilities as given in the table.
— table 1 about here —
Obviously, B, C and D are more reﬁned than A. Also, C and D are more reﬁned
than B: If all borrowers who receive a 0,5 % rating from C, and a randomly
selected 50 % of those who receive a rating 1,5 %, are given a rating of 1 %,
the rest a rating of 3 %, we obtain a new, well calibrated forecast with the
same probabilistic properties as B’s.
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The same can be done with D: All borrowers with ratings 0,5 % and 1 %, and a
randomly selected one-eleventh of borrowers rated 3 %, are given a new rating
of 1 %, the rest a new rating or 3 %. Again, this yields a new, well calibrated
forecast with the same probabilistic properties as B’s.
On the other hand, C and D cannot be compared according to the reﬁne-
ment ordering. DeGroot and Fienberg (1983, Theorem 1) show that, for well
calibrated forecasters A and B,
A ≥R B ⇐⇒
j−1∑
i=1
(aj − ai)[qA(ai)− qB(ai)] ≥ 0, j=1,...,k-1. (3)
and this condition is violated for C and D in our example. It is equivalent to
the fact that the distribution qA(ai) second-order stochastically dominates the
distribution qB(ai) (DeGroot and Eriksson 1985).
Vardeman and Meeden (1983) suggest to alternatively order probability fore-
casters according to the concentration of defaults in the ”bad” grades. This
will here be called the VM-default order. Formally:
A ≥VM(d) B :⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
qA(ai|1) ≤
j∑
i=1
qB(ai|1), j=1,...,k. (4)
Or to put this diﬀerently: A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden default
ordering if its conditional distribution, given default, ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates that of B.
The same can be done for the non-defaults. A is better than B in the VM-non-
default sense if non-defaults are more frequent in the ”good” grades. Formally:
A≥VM(nd)B ⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
qA(ai|0) ≥
j∑
i=1
qB(ai|0), j=1,...,k. (5)
Finally, A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden sense (in symbols A≥VMB)
if both A≥VM(d)B and A≥VM(nd)B.
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A ﬁnal criterion which is favoured in the banking industry (see e.g. Falkenstein
et al. 2000) is based on joining the points
(0, 0),


j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i),
j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i|1)

 , j = 1, ..., k (6)
by straight lines. The resulting plot is variously called the power curve, the
Lorenz curve, the Gini curve, or the cumulative accuracy proﬁle, and a fore-
caster A is considered better than a forecaster B in this - the Gini-default-sense
(formally: A ≥G(d) B) - if A’s Gini curve is nowhere below that of B.
Alternatively, one might consider the receiver-operating-characteristic curve
(ROC-curve) deﬁned by the points
(0, 0),


j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i|0),
j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i|1)

 , j = 1, ..., k. (7)
It is however easily seen (see e.g. Kra¨mer 2002, Theorem 3) that two Gini
curves intersect if and only if the respective ROC-curves intersect, so these
orderings are equivalent. Moreover, the area under the ROC-curve, which is
often used as a scalar criterion of goodness, is numerically identical to the well
known accuracy ratio derived from the Gini-curve, so the ROC-curve does not
produce any independent information.
Both the power and the ROC curve are invariant to monotone transformations
of the predicted probabilities of default. They only require that rating grades
are ordered in terms of probability of default and can therefore be applied in
a wider context than the one discussed above.
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3 Mapping rating grades to default probabili-
ties
Next, we apply the orderings described above to real world default predictions.
This is done in two stages. First, we take empirical relative frequencies as sub-
stitutes for unknown true probability functions and check the partial orderings
from section 2. Next, we explicitly recognize the randomness in the empirical
relative frequencies and test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences
observed.
Table 2 summarizes our data base. For each rating grade, it shows the number
of debtors carrying this rating as of Dec. 31, 1998, and the number of defaults
up to the end of 2002. There are 17 grades, with all debtors rated worse than
B- lumped together into grade C.
— table 2 about here —
Both the reﬁnement and the VM-orderings require that rating grades are con-
verted into default probabilities. We ﬁrst proceed under the assumptions that
(i) the true probabilities of default, given the rating grade, are the same for
both agencies (where the correspondence between grades is as in table 2), and
(ii) that the observed diﬀerences in empirical relative frequencies are due to
random noise. This assumption will be later on relaxed. In addition, to obtain
larger samples, we disregard the + and - subdivisions and estimate the grade
speciﬁc default probabilities by averaging the empirical relative frequencies
from Moody’s and S&P .
Column 3 in table 3 gives the results. Columns 4 and 5 give the historical
4-year default frequencies as reported by the agencies themselves.
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— table 3 about here —
The table shows that the 4-year default rates in our sample are somewhat
higher than the historical ones reported by the agencies themselves. The main
reason is that our horizon covers the years 2001 and 2002, which saw an excep-
tionally large number of defaults: 70 of the 209 defaults in our sample occurred
in 2001 and 58 occured in 2002. On the other hand the default rates reported
by the agencies are averages of 18 (S&P) or 30 (Moody’s) four-year default
horizons, covering various phases of the business cycle.
In addition to averaging over default horizons, some additional smoothing is
sometimes applied across rating grades to eliminate any remaining random
noise (see e.g. Tabakis and Vinci 2002, pp. 13 – 15 or Blum et al., 2003, pp. 21
– 26). One can for instance ﬁt a logit or a probit curve to the observed default
frequencies in order to obtain a smooth and increasing sequence of default
probabilities. Such issues will not be touched upon in this paper, as we are
mainly concerned with systematic diﬀerences in forecasting ability, not with
short-run eﬀects induced by random deviations from a long run performance
standard.
4 Comparing the accuracy of default
predictions
We start by checking the partial orderings from Section 2. Figure 1 shows
the Moody’s and S&P power curves, as derived from table 2, with + and -
subdivisions lumped together. It is seen that the power curves intersect, so
the rating agencies cannot be compared according to this criterion.
— ﬁgure 1 here —
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To obtain a similar result for the VM-criteria, table 4 lists the respective
distributions of class frequencies, given default and given no default. It shows
that Moody’s dominates S&P with respect to VM(d) and that S&P dominates
Moody’s with respect to VM(nd). This comes as no surprise in view of
theorem 1 in Kra¨mer (2002), which states that the VM-ordering implies the
Gini-ordering. As Moody’s and S&P cannot be compared according to the
Gini-ordering, they cannot be compared to the VM-ordering a forteriori.
The most one could hope for is comparability according to either VM(d) or
VM(nd), but not according to both (in the sense that one dominates the
other according to both criteria). This is exactly what we ﬁnd.
— table 4 about here —
As to the reﬁnement ordering, we have to check calibration ﬁrst. Here we have
the problem that the data are not consistent with the fact that both agencies
are well calibrated, at least if the distribution q(aj) of borrowers across rating
grades aj from table 2 can be viewed as typical for the agencies. A necessary
condition for calibration is that the overall predicted relative frequency of
default p(1) be the same for both agencies. Plugging the default probabilities
aj from table 3 into the general formula
p(1) =
∑
j
r(1, aj) =
∑
j
p(1|aj)q(aj) =
∑
j
ajq(aj) (8)
shows that we obtain diﬀerent results for Moody’s and for S&P. This is so no
matter which column of table 3 is used for the predicted default probabilities aj.
For instance, taking our own estimates from column 3 gives P S&P (1) = 9, 89%
and PM(1) = 11, 80%. For other columns, discrepancies are even larger.
One way out of this dilemma is to acknowledge that the equivalence of
the rating grades established in table 3 is not quite correct, i.e. that a
rating of BBB by S&P implies a (slightly) diﬀerent predicted probability
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of default than a rating of Baa2 by Moody’s. This in turn implies that
we have k = 14 rather than k = 7 predicted probabilities of default
(taking table 3 as our point of departure), with the probabilities them-
selves given for instance by columns 4 and 5. Plugging these probabilities
into formula (8) gives p(1) = 8, 45% for Moody’s and p(1) = 8, 02% for
S&P, so we still have the result that calibration for both agencies is incon-
sistent with the data.
However, if we identify realized default frequencies with predicted ones,
both agencies are well calibrated by deﬁnition. It then makes sense to check
whether one is more reﬁned than the other. We call this the empirical
reﬁnement ordering. Table 5 gives the results. It shows that the integrals of
the distribution functions intersect, so none of the agencies is in this sense
more reﬁned than the other.
— table 5 about here —
The non-comparability of the default predictions in terms of the empirical
reﬁnement ordering implies that diﬀerent scalar measures of performance will
rank the predictions diﬀerently. Most popular among these is the Brier score
(Brier 1950), deﬁned as
B =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(pi − θi)2, (9)
where pi is the predicted probability of default, and θi = 1 in case of default
and θi = 0 in case of no default. It takes its optimum value of B = 0 when the
only predicted probabilities of default are 0 and 1, and when predictions are
always correct (= perfect foresight). It takes its worst value of B = 1 when
the only predicted probabilities of default are 0 and 1, and when always the
opposite of what has been predicted occurs.
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If we attach to each borrower the default probability from table 3, column 4
(Moody’s) and column 5 (S & P), we obtain
BM = 0, 0684, BS&P = 0, 0735. (10)
If we attach to each borrower the default probability from table 3, column 3,
we obtain
BM = 0, 0662, BS&P = 0, 0689, (11)
and if we attach to each borrower the observed default rate of the class these
borrower has been sorted into, we obtain
BM = 0, 0660, BS&P = 0, 0686. (12)
As small values of the Brier score are ”good”, Moody’s outperforms S&P ac-
cording to this criterion. It also outperforms S&P according to the logarithmic
score, deﬁned as
L =
1
n
n∑
i=1
n(|pi + θi − 1|). (13)
The logarithmic score is always negative, with closeness to zero signalling a
good performance. For our data set, it takes the following values if default
probabilities from table 3, column 4 (Moody’s) and column 5 (S & P) are
used:
LM = −0, 2135, LS&P = −0, 2260. (14)
If we attach to each borrower the default probabilities from table 3, column 3,
we obtain
LM = −0, 2068, LS&P = −0, 2141. (15)
12
And if we attach to each borrower the observed default rates of the class the
borrower has been sorted into, we obtain
LM = −0, 2005, LS&P = −0, 2056. (16)
As large values of the logarithmic score are ”good”, Moody’s outperform S&P
also according to this criterion. They also outperform S&P according to the
spherical score, deﬁned as
S =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|pi + θi − 1|√
p2i + (1− pi)2
. (17)
This gives
SM = 0, 9025, SS&P = 0, 8963 (column 4 and 5)
SM = 0, 9048, SS&P = 0, 9015 (column 3)
SM = 0, 9051, SS&P = 0, 9019 (column 1 and 2)
As the spherical rule is always positive, with large values signalling superior
performance, Moody’s wins here as well.
However, it is easy to ﬁnd scores such that this ranking is reversed. This reversal
is made possible by the noncomparability of Moody’s and S&P in terms of the
empirical reﬁnement ordering. It is well known (see e.g. DeGroot and Eriksson
1985 for a review of this literature) that second order stochastic dominance of
a distribution qB(ai) by a distribution q
A(ai) is equivalent to the fact that
∑
i
g(ai)q
A(ai) ≥
∑
i
g(ai)q
B(ai) (18)
for all continuous convex functions g on the unit interval. On the other hand,
it is also well known (see e.g. Winkler 1996; the basic theorem is due to
Savage 1971) that, for well calibrated forecasters, all proper scoring rules
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S(p1, . . . , pn; θ1, . . . , θn) depend on the pi and θi only via the aj’s and can
be written as
S(p1, . . . , pn; θ1, . . . , θn) =
K∑
j=1
g(aj)q(aj) (19)
with some strictly convex function g. For the Brier score, for instance, we have
g(p) = p(1− p). (20)
If second order stochastic dominance fails, one can therefore always ﬁnd two
convex functions f and g (corresponding to two proper scoring rules Sf and
Sg) such that the ranking of two forecasters is reversed.
An example is the asymmetric version L∗ of the logarithmic score suggested
by Winkler (1994). Setting c = 0, 001 (Winkler’s notation) and equating ob-
served default rates to predicted ones, we obtain values of L∗,M = 0, 2446 and
L∗,S&P = 0, 2457, so S&P is slightly better now. For details, see Kra¨mer (2003
b).
5 Statistical Significance
Next we explicitly acknowledge the randomness in our data and brieﬂy com-
ment on the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in performance which we
have found. For instance, the accuracy ratios derived from ﬁgure 1 are 0,833
for Moody’s (ARM) and 0,819 for S & P (ARS), so there is a slight but in-
signiﬁcant advantage for Moody’s here. Adapting result on areas under the
ROC-curve from medical statistics, Engelmann et al. (2003) show that the
statistic
T =
(ARM − ARS)2
σ2ARM + σ
2
ARS
− 2σARM ,ARS
(21)
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is asymptotically chi-squared with one degree of freedom. Approximating the
variances σ2ARS and σ
2
ARM
and the covariance σARS ,ARM of the respective ac-
curacy ratios ARS and ARM by bootstrapping produces a p-value of 0,087.
Estimating these for the areas under the ROC-curve by sample values pro-
duces a slightly lower p-value of 0,076. None of these indicates a systematic
diﬀerence.
The asymptotic null distribution of the T -statistic (21) should be applied with
caution, however. It is derived on the analogy with similar signiﬁcance tests
for ROC-curves in medical statistics (see e.g. Hajian-Tilaki et al. 2002) and as-
sumes two independent simple random samples from the bivariate distributions
[qM(aj|1), qS(qj|1)] and [qM(aj|0), qS(aj|0)], respectively, with sample sizes n1
and n2 ﬁxed in advance. None of these requirements is met in the credit rating
context. If we consider the 1927 ratings from the present paper as a random
sample from a hypothetical universe of potential ratings, then the sample sizes
n1 and n2 are not ﬁxed but random and perfectly negatively correlated. And
more importantly, a sample of n observations from the bivariate distribution
r(θ, a) will in practice never be simple as the observed θ’s are known to be
positively correlated in practice. As the observed values of θ and a for a given
borrower are also highly correlated, this can then be shown to translate into
correlation among draws from the conditional distributions q(a|1) and q(a|0),
which are therefore not a simple random sample. As H0 in our case is not
rejected anyway, we do not investigate this issue any further here.
The same argument applies even more forcefully when assessing the signiﬁcance
of the diﬀerence of other scalar measures of performance. For the Brier score,
it is easily seen (see e.g. Redelmeier et al. 1991) that the statistic
Z =
∑n
i=1(θi − πi)(pSi − pMi )√∑n
i=1 πi(1− πi)(pSi − pMi )2
(22)
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where πi = (p
S
i + p
M
i )/2, is asymptotically standard normal when population
Brier scores are identical. In our sample, Z takes the value 3,78, which at ﬁrst
sight is highly signiﬁcant. However, as in the case of the Engelmann et al. T -
statistic, its limiting null distribution obtains only for simple random samples,
which in the rating context will almost never be observed in practice due to
the positive correlation among the θ’s.
6 Discussion
There are various shortcomings in our data. For instance, in order to obtain
a reasonable data base, we had to collect all ratings as of Dec. 31, 1998 ir-
respective of the date the rating was produced or changed. This implies that
the default probabilities from columns (1) - (3) of table 3 are for a horizon of
slightly more than four years. However, as ”no change” need not imply ”no
assessment of creditworthyness”, and both Moody’s and S&P are known for
keeping a close track of their customers, the presumption is that the ratings
observed in December 1998 closely mirror the then prevailing economic situ-
ation. Also, there are no large deviations in the age of the ratings between
Moody’s and S&P, so this ”ragged edge” problem is unlikely to produce addi-
tional discrepancies.
The major question of course is whether or not the sample summarized in table
2 can be taken as typical for the performance of the agencies. It does not cover
a full business cycle but rather the end and apex of an extraordinary upswing
and the beginning of a downturn in 2001 and 2002, were the majority of the
defaults occurred. Therefore, it is necessary keep on collecting data on other
4-years prediction periods to check the robustness of our results.
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Table 1:
The refinement ordering
among well calibrated probability forecasters
forecast of distribution of borrowers across
default probability predicted default probabilities
% A B C D
0.5 0 0 0.25 0.2
1 0 0,5 0 0.25
1.5 0 0 0.5 0
2 1 0 0 0
3 0 0,5 0 0.55
4.5 0 0 0.25 0
Table 2:
Distribution of borrowers across rating grades
S&P Moody’s
rating frequency number rating frequency number
grade of defaults grade of defaults
AAA 55 0 Aaa 42 0
AA+ 33 0 Aa1 47 0
AA 80 0 Aa2 90 0
AA- 157 0 Aa3 142 0
A+ 167 1 A1 160 0
A 201 0 A2 191 2
A- 171 2 A3 154 0
BBB+ 170 3 Baa1 170 3
BBB 189 4 Baa2 180 1
BBB- 148 9 Baa3 165 9
BB+ 77 9 Ba1 69 6
BB 77 11 Ba2 50 2
BB- 85 26 Ba3 90 24
B+ 147 53 B1 76 19
B 106 49 B2 104 36
B- 43 25 B3 114 50
C 21 17 C 83 57
1927 209 1927 209
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Table 3:
Default Probabilities (%)
our sample historical
Grade
Moody’s S & P average Moody’s S & P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AAA / Aaa 0 0 0 0.04 0.07
AA / Aa2 0 0 0 0.16 0.17
A / A2 0.40 0.56 0.48 0.36 0.48
BBB / Baaa2 2.52 3.16 2.84 1.69 2.58
BB / Ba2 15.31 19.25 17.41 8.76 11.69
B / B2 35.71 42.91 39.32 27.04 27.83
C / C 68.68 80.95 71.15 55.05 51.25
Table 4:
Conditional grade distributions given default
and no given default, respectively
S&P Moody’s
Grade ∑
q(aj|1)× 209 ∑ q(aj|0)× 1718 ∑ q(aj|1)× 209 ∑ q(aj|0)× 1718
AAA / Aaa 0 55 0 42
AA / Aa2 0 325 0 321
A / A2 3 861 2 824
BBB / Baaa2 19 1352 15 1326
BB / Ba2 65 1545 47 1503
B / B2 192 1712 152 1692
C / C 209 1718 209 1718
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Table 5: Second order stochastic dominance
of the distributions q(ai)
ai Moody’s S&P
(%) q(ai) Integral q(ai) Integral
0 16.66 0 16.86 0
0.40 26.21 0.065 0 0.067
0.56 0 0.135 27.97 0.094
2.52 26.72 0.978 0 0.976
3.16 0 1.418 26.31 1.259
15.31 10.85 9.977 0 9.906
19.25 0 13.043 12.40 12.706
35.71 15.26 26.289 0 26.463
42.91 0 33.171 15.27 32.471
68.68 4.31 57.832 0 57.933
80.95 0 70.111 1.19 70.065
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Figure 1: Power Curves for Moody’s and S&P
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